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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE, PHASE V 
N.P.S. AND PACIFIC FORUM CONFERENCE FOR DTRA/ASCO, MAY 2010 
By Michael Glosny and Christopher Twomey 
Background and Process 
• The fifth annual U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue brought one PLA officer of flag rank as well 
as two retired field grade officers, three analysts from “official” Chinese think tanks, and two 
scholars from Chinese universities to meet with some 20 U.S. analysts and officials 
specializing in nuclear affairs.  All PLA were from defense academies or think tanks. 
• Military participation was at a lower level than in previous dialogues, due to China’s decision 
to freeze military-to-military exchanges after January 2010 arms sales to Taiwan.  The 
government scientific community was also not permitted to attend. 
• The agenda connected current strategic policy to both sides’ long-term disarmament goals. 
• Compared to eight previous DTRA-funded meetings in Hawaii and Beijing since 2004, this 
was the most open and least prone to recitations of official PRC talking points on Taiwan, 
missile defense, an American emphasis on nuclear weapons, and U.S. alliance relationships. 
• In addition to panel presentations, the meeting utilized breakout groups that discussed the 
meaning of a dozen terms such as “reliable and effective” and “key points strikes,” and the 
context in which they are used.  Both delegations agreed these were highly useful.   
Chinese Force Structure, Posture, and Strategy 
• Chinese participants emphasized that the goal of Beijing’s nuclear modernization is to 
maintain a “lean and effective” deterrent.  Although the precise analytical link was not 
explicit, experts referred to it as the principle for determining nuclear force posture.  
• There is a deepening recognition that the “ceiling” on China’s nuclear force modernization 
may affect the future of U.S. and Russia arms control negotiations.   
• China’s adherence to its NFU was discussed, although it did not dominate the conference.   
• Chinese participants saw value in deterring crossing the nuclear threshold, not in warfighting 
or controlling nuclear escalation after the threshold was crossed.  
• Participants resisted offering clear answers in hypothetical discussions regarding whether 
conventional strikes on China’s arsenal would lead to a nuclear response.  The participants 
signaled they might, but at the same time, did not question the NFU policy.  They seem to 
recognize ambiguity (or contradictions) on this point can contribute to deterrence. 
• The rationale for China’s MD system was not well understood by any participant. 
Chinese Views on U.S. Strategic Weapons Policy 
• China’s response to the NPR bas not been announced and likely is not yet determined.  
• Chinese participants welcomed changes in the NPR: de-emphasis on nuclear weapons, shift 
in declaratory policy, no mention of Taiwan, nor discussion of China as a potential target. 
• Concerns were raised regarding prompt global strike and missile defense, as well as whether 
or not U.S. extended nuclear deterrence included Taiwan. 
• Chinese participants received a detailed academic presentation on the current U.S. missile 
defense program. Even official participants suggested that these details were new to them and 
were very interested in taking this information back to Beijing.  Of particular interest was the 
limited effect of SM-3 and Patriot systems against relevant Chinese systems and strategies.  
• China continues to worry about the effect even a modest GBI deployment has on its arsenal.  
China seems to view the comparatively open U.S. engagement with Russia on MD with envy. 
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• Chinese experts expressed worries about BMD’s military and political implications for 
Taiwan and concern that it strengthened regional alliances aimed at China.  
Chinese Views on U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Policy 
• Chinese participants welcomed New START and the Administration’s Prague vision.   
• They expressed concerns regarding the sustainability of domestic support for these goals and 
noted the limitations inherent in New START’s counting rules (i.e., only deployed warheads). 
• Chinese participants equated Chinese participation in formal nuclear negotiations with 
quantitative arms reductions, which they consider premature given relative arsenal sizes.  
Their understanding of the broader range of possible CSBMs seemed thin, and they did not 
clearly differentiate official negotiations from informal discussions in this regard. 
• Nevertheless, there was great interest in learning more about the U.S.-Russian negotiations. 
• Chinese participants were more specific in discussions of the conditions under which they 
might participate in multilateral nuclear negotiations than they had been in the past.  
Although not universally, they generally preferred such negotiations to be comprehensive 
both in issues discussed (space, BMD, PGS) and players involved (P-5, P5+3, etc.). 
• China also expressed strong support for CTBT and significant support for FMCT. 
Miscellaneous 
• The potential threat to China from India’s nuclear weapons received more attention from 
Chinese participants than in past dialogues, and India was mentioned more often in general. 
• China’s policy on the North Korea issue remained obstructionist.  Compared to previous 
years, there was some regression away from viewing the dangers of North Korean 
proliferation to the region and China’s interests. 
• There seems to be civil-military differences and indeed tension within the Chinese military 
regarding some issues that has not previously manifested in this sort of dialogue. 
Policy Recommendations 
• The U.S. should continue to emphasize and clarify its policy on several issues.  BMD’s and 
PGS’s limited threat to China’s arsenal should continue to be discussed in some detail. The 
concept of strategic stability should be further elucidated.  Taiwan’s limited role in regional 
missile defense architectures should be laid out. 
• The U.S. should probe China on several issues regarding its policy.  What are the analytic 
links between “lean and effective” and force posture? How will China’s transparency 
increase as its arsenal becomes less vulnerable due to modernization? What is China’s plan in 
the event of a North Korean collapse, and what sort of U.S./ROK response crosses redlines? 
• Further questioning the credibility of the NFU in the context of PGS is unlikely to remove 
ambiguity on China’s response and deepens its concerns about U.S. intentions. 
• The USG (and Russia) should reinforce the view that future cuts in their arsenal sizes depend 
inversely on potential growth in the Chinese arsenal.   
• The U.S. and possibly Russia should engage the Chinese arms control community, including 
those emerging within the Second Artillery, on New START and on future negotiations.  
Briefs on the nature of these negotiations and the value each side has derived from them 
would serve to deepen the (shallow) Chinese understanding of strategic arms control. 
• Chinese positions on CTBT and FMCT seem to have improved.  Conditional statements of 
future action may be possible and should be solicited. 
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• Terminology, its context, and relevant definitions are poorly understood on each side and 
should be the focus of additional study. 
• Additional coordination among the various track II processes, and to some extent with the 
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ctwomey@nps.edu or twomeycp@nps.navy.smil.mil 
 
 This report summarizes a recently held track II conference among U.S. 
and Chinese analysts and officials on strategic nuclear issues. This report begins by 
explaining the history of this series of meetings as well as describing the backgrounds of 
the participants and format of this session.  The substantive discussion that follows is 
organized thematically rather than strictly following the panel structure from the 
conference, so as to capture the key points in a more logical and analytical fashion.  It 
begins by highlighting core findings with regard to each side’s nuclear policy and 
strategy and some discussion of their nuclear arsenals.  In do doing it particularly 
emphasizes the perceptions of each side regarding the other’s nuclear forces and 
strategies.  Then it summarizes the key points regarding both sides’ views of arms control 
and disarmament policy.  A few brief miscellaneous points are discussed before the 
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report concludes with a number of policy recommendations and discussion of potential 




 The fifth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in 
Honolulu, HI from May 2 to 4, 2010.  The Dialogue is a track II conference; thus, it is 
formally unofficial, but includes a mix of government and academic participants.  The 
Dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum CSIS and is 
funded and guided by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency.  
As the leading agency responsible for addressing threats from weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), DTRA/ASCO seeks to enhance American situational awareness of 
Chinese nuclear strategies and capabilities, reduce the prospects for proliferation in Asia 
and beyond, and more broadly enhance American deterrence in a time of transformation.  
Particular interests guiding DTRA/ASCO’s leadership of this project have focused on 
identifying important misperceptions, misunderstandings, and key divergences in national 
interests, with a goal of reducing these over the long term. 
 Thus, the goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify 
important misperceptions regarding each side’s nuclear strategy and doctrine and 
highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building measures that might 
reduce such dangers. The first four conferences of this series focused their discussions on 
general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, national threat perceptions in 
strategic affairs, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of each 
side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and strategic stability.  
(Conference reports for the first four years have been published previously and are 
available on NPS web pages.) 
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 This year, the participants on the U.S. side included participants from 
think tanks such as CSIS, RAND, NBR, and CNA; universities such NPS, NDU, and 
Stanford; and observers from State, the Department of Defense, Pacific Command, and 
Strategic Command.  The U.S. participants totaled over twenty persons.  On the Chinese 
side, participants included one PLA officer of flag rank as well as two retired field grade 
officers working at official PLA think tanks, three analysts from “official” civilian 
Chinese think tanks, and two scholars from Chinese universities.  The freeze in military 
to military ties imposed by China in the wake of the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan resulted in 
a lower-than-usual ranking Chinese delegation.  
 One of the goals of this series of meetings is to create something of a 
community of regular participants who develop some accumulated learning and perhaps 
some personal trust that might facilitate a more open discussion.  Typically at least half of 
the attendees have participated in a previous dialogue, as was the case this year. 
 The meeting was organized around four panels (see the attached agenda) 
centering on connecting contemporary doctrine to long-term disarmament goals, which 
are a renewed emphasis for both sides.  The meeting began with wide-ranging 
discussions about the potential for complete abolition of nuclear weapons in the distant 
future and the preconditions and process for achieving this goal. This topic, far removed 
from contemporary events, forced all participants off usual talking points and helped 
pave the way for a relatively frank and open discussion throughout the two days.  
Thereafter, each side discussed contemporary nuclear policy and missile defense policy 
for themselves and the other country.  Finally, there was a discussion of near terms steps 
with regard to arms control and confidence building measures.   
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For these traditional panels, each had two short presentations.  These sessions of 
the conference were structured to maximize time for discussion rather than focus on 
vetted presentations.  While that is always the goal, in this particular instance it was—by 
and large—met.  Most participants regarded these discussions as the most open to date.   
The meeting also included breakout sessions in which smaller groups of 
participants engaged in very informal discussions about the meaning of a dozen specific 
terms such as “strategic stability” and “key point counterattack”.  (The full list of terms is 
attached.)  Each group was asked to discuss what the terms meant and provide some of 
the context for their usage.  The goal was explicitly not to come to consensus definitions, 
but rather to understand the commonalities and the differences of how the terms were 
used, and some sense of their role in each side’s thinking about nuclear issues (some 
terms were more commonly used by one side than the other).  The resulting non-vetted, 
presentation served as the basis for a vigorous discussion in a plenary session the next 
day.    
A few general points came out of this discussion.  First, participants from both 
sides noted that some of the terms, while used in official documents, were not the most 
important terms.  (Indeed, some were dismissed disdainfully.)  The track II level is 
particularly useful for this sort of frank commentary about one’s own official documents.  
Second, in some cases, terms that were originally used in the 1950s in English were 
translated into Chinese to facilitate their understanding of U.S. doctrine.  These terms 
might then be used by China as a way to communicate back to the U.S. without 
understanding the full nuance of the term (e.g., escalation control).  In short, a sequence 
of incomplete translations is a recipe for misunderstanding. 
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It will be worthwhile to continue this discussion of definitions and concepts.1
                                                 
1 To some extent, these breakout sessions were already building on the foundations laid by the 
National Academy of Sciences and their Chinese counterparts in the publication of the 274 page English-
Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary (2008). 
 One 
possible way forward to continue to develop this would be standalone projects for small 
teams of researchers.   
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CHINA’S NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION, NUCLEAR DOCTRINE, 
AND NO-FIRST USE PLEDGE: 
Throughout the two days, and transcending the panel on contemporary doctrine 
per se, participants discussed China’s views on its own nuclear arsenal.   
NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
Chinese participants unanimously argued that the fundamental mission of China’s 
nuclear forces is to prevent nuclear attack against China.  Most Chinese experts also 
agreed that China should only use nuclear weapons after a nuclear attack.  One Chinese 
participant argued that this fundamental mission had remained stable and consistent for 
the last four decades.  In support of this view, others cited relevant sections of the 2006 
and 2008 Chinese Defense White Papers.  With no allies or responsibility to defend other 
countries, Chinese experts emphasized that China has no need for extended deterrence.  
One participant suggested that unlike the United States (a point returned to in a later 
section), China’s no-first use (NFU) policy shows that it neither emphasizes the role of 
nuclear weapons nor has a policy of preemption.   
Although Chinese experts mostly focused on the continuities of China’s nuclear 
forces, one highlighted the growing emphasis on conventional missiles within the Second 
Artillery over the last 10-15 years, mostly driven by the need to deter the threat of 
Taiwan independence.  The implications of the conventional elements of the Second 
Artillery being focused on more offensive missions, while the nuclear elements of the 
Second Artillery are focused on defensive, retaliatory missions was not addressed by 
Chinese experts, but is worth exploring in the future.    
 Discussions among the Chinese participants shed new light on how they 
understand and conceptualize “minimum deterrence,” which is the term often used to 
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describe China’s nuclear doctrine.  Minimum deterrence was described as a “dynamic 
and relative term” and repeatedly emphasized that China was concerned with capabilities, 
not numbers.  This concept referred to the minimum capability required to deter nuclear 
use and possess a credible retaliatory capability, although some suggested that 
“minimum” could mean a lot of different things.  Other Chinese participants argued that 
although China’s requirements are to maintain sufficient forces for minimum deterrence, 
what that means in terms of quantity and quality of nuclear forces depends on many 
factors, including developments in U.S. missile defense plans.  They emphasized the 
reactive nature of China’s force structure and argued that even if other factors compelled 
China to increase the quality or quantity of its nuclear forces, its general defensive 
doctrine would not change.  The interactive element in China’s modernization was 
emphasized more than in previous dialogues. 
 Chinese participants argued that “lean and effective” (jinggan youxiao) is 
the preferred description for the requirements of China’s nuclear forces.  One of the 
definition breakout groups discussed the term “effective and reliable deterrence” (youxiao 
kekao weishe),2
                                                 
2 One Chinese expert offered a preferred translation of this term as “effective and assured deterrence.”  
However, assured, as in “mutual assured destruction,” is usually translated as quebao, not kekao. 
 but Chinese participants suggested that this was an older formulation.  
Participants argued that although “effective and reliable” had been discussed earlier in the 
decade, the 2006 and 2008 Defense White Papers had adopted the “lean and effective” 
formulation and that had become the official description of requirements.  Chinese 
experts argued that these were the characteristics that China’s nuclear forces must have to 
ensure a second-strike retaliatory capability.  Moreover, one participant clearly suggested 
that these were the criteria that China used in determining force posture.  It was not clear 
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precisely what “effective” meant, but Chinese participants emphasized that “lean” 
referred to limited numbers.   
 The American participants were particularly interested in “lean and 
effective” as principles for force structure planning and asked the Chinese participants to 
talk more about how this principle affected force structure decisions.  One American 
participant suggested that being clear and open about how these requirements translated 
into force planning was exactly the kind of transparency the U.S. was asking for on 
nuclear capabilities, and indicated that providing such information would go a long way 
towards addressing many worries in the United States concerning China’s nuclear forces.  
Another American expert asked how China made the judgment that a certain number of 
nuclear weapons would guarantee China’s retaliatory capability.  Others asked what 
important external factors, besides U.S. missile defense, could impact the size of China’s 
arsenal. Several U.S. participants asked how numbers factored into China’s assessments 
of whether its forces had met the requirements of being “lean and effective.”   
 Chinese participants did not provide very specific answers to these 
requests for more information on the analytical link between the requirements of a “lean 
and effective” force and force sizing decisions. What was promising was that a clearer 
link between this diplomatic phrasing of “lean and effective” and the force structure 
existed; this was apparent across the board in Chinese discussions.  Fleshing out our 
understanding of that link would be an important goal going forward.   
Transparency of China’s nuclear forces and doctrine came up at several different 
points during the dialogue.  In response to questions about when China will become more 
transparent about its nuclear modernization, Chinese participants argued that China’s 
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nuclear doctrine and the conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons was 
already very transparent.  Echoing a common refrain in past dialogues, experts also 
suggested that the U.S. was not very transparent on these issues itself.  One participant 
further cited the 2008 Defense White Paper that provided a much greater amount of 
official information on China’s nuclear modernization efforts.   
The PLA has provided more information on some aspects of nuclear 
modernization, but the limitations on Chinese transparency on nuclear capabilities was 
clear.  In estimating of the size of China’s nuclear stockpiles, Chinese experts were 
forced to cite American sources, because no official information is available from China. 
Nevertheless, in an important new development, Chinese participants suggested an 
understanding that the size of the Chinese arsenal and how it might affect the nuclear 
arsenals of other countries.  
NO FIRST USE 
While not a centerpiece of the agenda, Chinese participants reaffirmed China’s 
commitment to its NFU pledge.  As part of the definitional breakout groups, Chinese 
participants defined NFU as “a policy of not using nuclear weapons unless attacked by 
nuclear weapons first.”  In addition to claims of China’s peaceful and defensive strategic 
culture, a Chinese expert cited China’s historical experience as strong evidence for the 
credibility of the NFU pledge.  During the Cold War China faced multiple crises and 
wars, and according to this expert, there is no evidence that China considered using 
nuclear weapons, threatened to use nuclear weapons, or even considered threatening to 
use them.  Another Chinese participant further argued that China’s strong land forces 
made the NFU pledge more credible because it would be unlikely to face conventional 
military defeat that might lead to incentives to use nuclear weapons first.  Even if China 
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faced nuclear attacks from countries other than the U.S. or Russia, a Chinese expert 
argued that China’s conventional forces might be sufficient for retaliation and China 
might not even use nuclear weapons if attacked by nuclear weapons.  Another expert 
supported this view by suggesting that American concerns about Chinese use of nuclear 
weapons during a war were based on the assumption that China would be facing a 
conventional defeat; given PLA modernization, this expert suggested this might not be 
the case. This echoes points made in previous dialogues in which the Chinese side 
suggests that the burden of escalation will fall on the United States.  Another participant 
argued somewhat differently, that China’s nuclear and conventional were completely 
delinked, noting that even during the Cold War when China was weak militarily, Beijing 
was still comfortable with a minimum deterrent capability and stood by its NFU. 
 American participants pushed for greater clarity on the conditions under 
which China might consider abandoning its NFU, especially during potential crises.  
These questions led to clear frustration among Chinese participants. The implication was 
that pushing too hard for clarity, especially based in the context of hypothetical U.S.-
China crises and war, would produce mistrust and make the relationship more 
adversarial.   
Although sensitive to these concerns, several American participants highlighted 
the utility of such frank discussions.  One expert argued that having such abstract and 
hypothetical discussions now helped identify potential areas of misperception, potential 
instability, and inadvertent escalation.  Another expert also noted that understanding U.S. 
concerns about whether China’s NFU pledge will remain credible under a wide range of 
situations can help China understand why the U.S. does not adopt its own NFU policy.  
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In the definition breakout groups, participants discussed several terms related to crisis 
and escalation, including “escalation control,” “inadvertent escalation,” “crisis stability,” 
and “nuclear threshold.”  In these detailed discussions of hypothetical crisis dynamics, no 
Chinese participant admitted that these dynamics would put severe pressure on China’s 
NFU pledge, nor that in such a crisis China might have to reconsider its NFU policy.    
TRANSWAR DETERRENCE AND TARGETING 
Discussions among Chinese participants also made it clear that China only sees a 
role for nuclear weapons in preventing escalation of war from the conventional to nuclear 
realm.  Beijing sees no role for nuclear weapons in controlling war or escalation once the 
war had already become nuclear (at any level).  This discussion emerged during the 
plenary discussion of the definition for “escalation control.”  One group argued that the 
Chinese side is not convinced that this term has relevance in the nuclear context.  In 
response, two Americans argued that Chinese nuclear doctrinal writings contain 
numerous references to controlling war and controlling escalation.  In response, a 
Chinese expert argued that China only saw utility for nuclear weapons in preventing the 
war from going nuclear.  However, once the war had crossed the nuclear threshold, the 
Chinese saw no role for nuclear weapons in controlling further escalation and saw no role 
for “nuclear warfighting.” 
The discussions of the term “key point counterattack” (zhongdian fanji) also 
deepened understanding of how China thinks about nuclear targeting.  Chinese experts 
argued that because China has few nuclear weapons, it needs to be very selective in the 
targets it chooses.3
                                                 
3 One Chinese expert suggested that this phrase came from General ZHANG Aiping who in the mid-
1990s developed an 8-character requirement for nuclear forces.  This requirement was “tight defense, key 
point counterattack” (yanmifanghu, zhongdianfanji).    
 Chinese participants denied that it had a counter-force implication. 
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The Chinese participants did not provide greater detail of the considerations and factors 
that determined what was a “key point.”  It should also be pointed out that this phrase has 
not appeared in any of China’s Defense White Papers.   
CHINA’S MISSILE DEFENSE TEST 
 In January 2010, China reportedly conducted a successful high-altitude 
anti-ballistic missile test.  However, the details of this test and the strategy behind such a 
system were not well understood by most Chinese.  The Chinese side discussed its BMD 
test, but experts admitted that they had little specific data on BMD, which was a very 
sensitive issue within China. 
 Chinese experts offered a range of potential explanations for China’s 
BMD test and roles for a BMD system.  One participant argued that China’s BMD 
system was not part of a larger move to develop space capabilities or weaponize space.  
On the contrary, this expert argued that bilateral interactions with the U.S. were sufficient 
to explain China’s motivations to develop such a system.  Chinese participants cited 
articles by WU Tianfu and SHEN Dingli, which explained the BMD test as a response to 
American BMD systems.  They argued that although China would prefer to live in a 
world without missile defenses, developments in U.S. BMD systems forced China to 
defend itself by developing its own BMD system.  The logic of how a Chinese BMD 
system would reduce its vulnerability was not spelled out clearly, but Chinese experts 
suggested that this was the most widely accepted explanation for the Chinese test and 
BMD program.  The Chinese side also suggested that one of the major changes in recent 
years was that Chinese officials and researchers have accepted that missile defense 
cannot be stopped, and the BMD program is an attempt to make the best of that situation. 
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 Chinese experts offered a few other potential factors that might have led 
China to conduct the test and develop the BMD program.  One expert suggested that 
many within China believed that the rest of the region and world would accept this as a 
reasonable defense requirement, and there was a broader sense that the international 
community wanted to accommodate China rather than challenge it.  Another participant 
also noted that there was no international or domestic law that prohibited China from 
conducting such a test.  Other Chinese participants mentioned the importance of prestige 
and demonstrating to the world that it had such a capability.  An American expert 
speculated that one reasonable factor for China to develop a BMD capability might be to 
defend itself against Indian nuclear weapons, but none of the Chinese participants 
directly engaged this point.  
 How a BMD system might be deployed was not clear, but Chinese 
participants were unanimous in their view that a BMD system would not change China’s 
nuclear doctrine or affect its own NFU pledge.  Several Chinese participants suggested 
that China would not only continue its focus on defensive nuclear counter-attack, but that 
a BMD system would enhance the survivability of Chinese nuclear weapons, and 
therefore make NFU even more credible.  The development of a BMD system, however, 
would not mean that China should not continue improving its own nuclear capabilities.  
Even with its own BMD system, effective deterrence would still rest on China’s ability to 
reliably penetrate the other side’s missile defenses, so U.S. BMD could still affect the 
size of China’s nuclear forces. 
 One Chinese participant also argued that Chinese experts have recognized 
that BMD is very expensive, so it may only serve a limited role in China’s future military 
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modernization.  The participant further argued that cruise missiles and other offensive 
weapons might prove more cost effective.  Chinese participants did not address questions 
on the relationship between the BMD test or program and China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) 
capability.   
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U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS POLICY 
 The conference was timed in part to permit discussions of the recently 
released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  In the event, the NPR only was released weeks 
prior to the conference. Because China had not yet formulated an official response to the 
NPR, there was no discussion of the formal PRC reaction or policy.  On the other hand, 
the Chinese interlocutors were able to probe for additional understanding of the NPR 
while their government’s formal response was being developed, as well as express some 
initial concerns about the NPR.  The timing also offered an opportunity for the U.S. to 
address ambiguities and provide a more comprehensive understanding of U.S. policy to 
better inform China’s official response.   
 While the Ballistic Missile Defense Review had been out longer, it is 
unclear how much the Chinese side has engaged with that at this time.  Thus, discussions 
of policy in that area were also fruitful. 
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW   
 The American side discussed the important elements of the NPR.  The 
2010 NPR contained numerous continuities with previous NPRs, such as continued 
emphasis on extended deterrence, discussion of strategic capabilities in a broader context, 
and repeated rhetoric of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.  According to American 
participants, however, there were significant changes in this NPR.  First, preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear terrorism has been elevated to the top of the U.S. nuclear agenda 
for the first time.  This has included increased funding for cooperative threat reduction 
and the Department of Energy.  This should be a positive foundation on which to develop 
Sino-American cooperation, as the interests of both countries converge on this issue.  
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Second, the change in declaratory policy has eliminated ambiguity associated with using 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.  Moreover, the NPR repeated that 
the “bar” for using nuclear weapons was very high.  Third, the NPR devotes significant 
attention and funding to nuclear infrastructure, which has been neglected for many years.  
Fourth, the references to China in the 2010 NPR are much more positive.  
In general, the Chinese participants were positive in their assessments of the NPR.  
(At the time of the conference, a short piece by retired Major General XU Guangyu had 
appeared in the PLA Daily, but it was never mentioned by Chinese interlocutors so it 
does not seem to represent the formal response to the NPR.)  One Chinese expert 
suggested that the “NPR made an effort to send a positive message” and another 
explicitly said that this NPR had addressed some of China’s worries and decreased some 
of its concerns.  All participants were pleased at the de-emphasis on nuclear weapons and 
saw the lack of calls for developing new nuclear weapons as a positive development.  
Chinese experts were pleased that the NPR did not mention Taiwan or name 
contingencies for potential use of nuclear weapons, and believed that China was less of a 
target in this NPR.  The NPR’s negative security assurance was not quite a full 
endorsement of an NFU, according to one expert, but it was definitely a step in the right 
direction.  Chinese participants were also pleased that the U.S. seemed close to accepting 
a nuclear relationship based on mutual vulnerability, but had questions on exactly what 
U.S. policy was on this issue. 
 Given the overall positive assessment of this NPR, several American 
participants asked what effect this would have on the relationship.  Some asked if this 
would reduce mistrust and lead to more positive views of U.S. intentions, especially in 
26 
 
the military realm.  Others asked if this might encourage the Chinese to be more 
forthcoming in sharing information about their nuclear modernization.  Still others asked 
if a more positive relationship in the nuclear arena might lead to greater cooperation in 
other issue areas, such as deeper cooperation on North Korea and Iran.  The Chinese 
participants were somewhat guarded in their response to these big questions.  Most 
Chinese experts suggested that it would help the overall relationship by removing an 
irritant and obstacle (i.e., the referencing of China as a potential target in the leaked 
portions of the 2001 NPR), and one participant said that it would encourage franker 
dialogue, but these responses were rather vague.  
 Although the overall response was positive, Chinese participants 
expressed some concerns and questions about U.S. nuclear policy as expressed in the 
NPR.  Chinese participants were most concerned about the implications of conventional 
prompt global strike (PGS).  Several Chinese experts asked for clarification on its 
purpose, what the capabilities will ultimate look like, and whether or not such capabilities 
could be targeted at Chinese nuclear facilities.  One participant characterized PGS as a 
significant impediment to nuclear stability and disarmament.  Some Americans tried to 
reassure the Chinese experts by characterizing PGS as a “niche capability.”  American 
experts argued that the purpose was to have a capability to quickly respond to time-
sensitive targets around the globe.  Although the scope of the capabilities that will result 
from the PGS concept are still unknown, they suggested that it would likely be too 
limited to undermine China’s nuclear deterrent.  Moreover, not only did the NPR endorse 
maintaining “strategic stability” with China, but public testimony by Principal Deputy 
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Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller referred to the need to develop PGS 
capabilities without undermining strategic stability with Russia and China. 
 Several questions were also raised about the scope of U.S. nuclear 
commitments and the conditions of use of nuclear weapons.  One Chinese expert noticed 
a new reference to “allies and partners,” and asked if this meant that Taiwan was a 
partner that would fall under America’s nuclear umbrella.    This expert was pleased at 
the reduced emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons, but asked if war between China and 
Taiwan would be an extreme circumstance under which the U.S. might consider using 
nuclear weapons.  A Chinese participant also asked for clarification on the negative 
security commitment in the NPR, according to which the U.S. would not use or threaten 
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons countries that were party to the NPT 
and in compliance.  This expert asked who decided if a country was in compliance with 
the NPT.  An American participant responded that the U.S. would make such a judgment, 
and emphasized that the aim of this approach was to incentivize states to fully comply 
with the NPT regime and see security benefits from being in full compliance.  These 
issues on the conditions for use, especially as relate to Taiwan, are likely to come up in 
future dialogues. 
 Another Chinese expert was pleased with most aspects of the NPR, but 
asked for more information about increased funding for nuclear infrastructure, and 
wondered if this was a secret way to secure funding to develop more nuclear weapons.  
One American participant responded that this was not related to developing new nuclear 
weapons, but should probably be viewed as the domestic political price for getting 
approval for New START treaty with Russia.  Another American emphasized that this 
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infrastructure has been ignored for decades and improvements are required not only to 
guarantee the safety and security of U.S. nuclear forces, but this would become even 
more important as the U.S. reduces its number of nuclear weapons.  Related to concerns 
about whether momentum for disarmament would last in the United States, one Chinese 
participant suggested that every administration does a new NPR and questioned whether 
the elements in this NPR would be enduring or if the next administration would likely 
change them.  (The discussions of the BMD elements in the NPR are discussed in the 
section below on BMD.)     
 Chinese experts were still trying to figure out the meaning and 
implications of the NPR elevating China to the level of Russia.  In the most negative 
response to this development, a Chinese expert argued that the assessment of China’s 
nuclear modernization as extending beyond deterrence was incorrect, and worried that 
elevating China’s status was also a way to overestimate the threat China posed to the 
United States.  
 Most of the discussion related to how each side defined a stable nuclear 
relationship and whether or not the NPR’s characterization of bilateral nuclear relations 
was a sufficient foundation for stability.  Issues of stability were not only explored during 
discussions of the NPR, but also in the definitional breakout groups, as “strategic 
stability” was one of the terms that was discussed.  The consensus definition was that a 
stable nuclear relationship required both sides to agree that they felt secure.  Chinese 
participants argued that stability could look different in different bilateral relations.  For 
example, U.S.-Russian stability is focused on numbers and parity, whereas China is not 
seeking parity.  Therefore, from China’s perspective, nuclear relations could be stable 
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with nuclear capabilities far weaker than the Russians might require.  Discussions among 
Chinese participants also led to a distinction between “strategic balance” (zhanlue 
pingheng) and “strategic stability” (zhanlue wending), although all participants were clear 
that neither concept required numerical parity.  Future engagement might do well to 
address the Cold War meanings of this term, as that will be reassuring to China. 
 In the discussions of the NPR, Chinese participants asked whether the U.S. 
had officially accepted mutual vulnerability as the basis of the nuclear relationship.  The 
American participants emphasized that the document did not use that phrase.  
Nevertheless, the U.S. participants emphasized that the U.S. does send intend to 
communicate a positive signal to China.  American participants referred to language in 
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and NPR that the U.S. does not intend to 
undermine strategic stability or affect the strategic balance with Russia or China.  The 
American side asked whether the Chinese saw these statements, and unofficial 
endorsement of mutual vulnerability, as adequate to reassure them on this issue.  There is 
some sign that the Chinese are beginning to find a degree of reassurance in them, but that 
will need to be reemphasized in a range of fora.   
Relatedly, American participants tried to correct Chinese misunderstandings 
regarding its lack of a NFU policy, as they have repeatedly in past dialogues.  First, they 
suggested that the long-standing American position is to only consider using nuclear 
weapons as a last resort.  Second, as has been stated many times by American 
participants in these dialogues and in other settings, they argued that not having an NFU 
does not mean that the U.S. takes nuclear weapons lightly or that it has a policy of 
preemption.   
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
 The U.S. missile defense plans have been a source of deep anxiety for the 
Chinese and have been discussed in previous dialogues.  Experts from the American side 
discussed the details of the evolution of BMD architecture and the plans under the Obama 
Administration.  They characterized the current approach as less comprehensive than the 
Bush Administration’s plans, more focused on theater missile defenses, and more focused 
on the terminal phase.  The Obama administration’s approach is designed to address near-
term threats by relying on proven technology.  Current plans also call for deployment of 
relatively limited BMD capabilities.     
The analysis and discussion by the American participants directly addressed 
several of the worries and concerns from the Chinese side.  The American experts 
emphasized that the BMD architecture will not pose a threat to China in the near term.  
Although unlikely to completely reassure China and address all of its concerns, future 
frank discussions regarding the evolution of America’s BMD architecture may be able to 
correct some misunderstandings and eliminate some sources of mistrust.  
 Chinese participants did, however, express many military and political 
concerns with American BMD plans.  First, Chinese participants argued that this 
capability does undermine China’s nuclear deterrence and increases instability.  One 
expert suggested that it was difficult to believe that the U.S. would undertake such a large 
expense merely to deter small and medium-sized powers, so most Chinese experts have 
concluded that BMD must be aimed at China.  Several participants argued that BMD was 
a signal of America’s hostile intent towards China and that developing these capabilities 
damages relations and reduces mutual trust.  American experts responded by emphasizing 
the grave potential threat that the U.S. sees from small and medium-sized countries with 
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nuclear weapons, and the importance of protecting the U.S. homeland from such rogues.  
In terms of BMD being aimed at China, several American participants pointed out that 
according to estimates of China’s nuclear modernization program, it could easily 
overwhelm the limited BMD system that the United States is building.   
Moreover, recent decisions in BMD architecture show that the U.S. is focusing on 
defending itself from the threats of small and medium-sized countries, rather than 
optimizing the BMD plans to counter a potential threat from China.  The U.S. 
emphasized that the ground based interceptor (GBI) arsenal was limited in current plans.  
This issue, as well as the discontinuation of multiple kill vehicle research on missile 
defense interceptors, is important issues for assessing the direction of U.S. missile 
defense plans.  
 Second, Chinese experts argued that America’s cooperation with Russia 
on BMD, but lack of such cooperation with China, makes China feel unequal and 
undermines mutual trust in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.  Several Chinese 
participants called attention to U.S. exchanges of information and coordination with the 
Russians on missile defense, including suggestions that the United States takes Russian 
concerns seriously while ignoring Chinese concerns. In response, several American 
participants told the Chinese that they should not view the decision to change European 
BMD deployments as a concession to the Russians, but rather as a decision based on 
American interests.  The United States does share information on BMD with Russia, but 
American participants argued that the United States has also made great efforts to explain 
BMD plans to China. U.S. participants emphasized that if China wanted greater 
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cooperation on BMD, Chinese government officials needed to make formal requests 
through official channels. 
   Third, Chinese participants raised concerns about the implications of 
BMD for Taiwan.  One participant argued that Taiwan was the most important element in 
Chinese concerns about BMD.  Militarily, Chinese experts worried that the U.S. might 
extend its missile defense architecture to defend Taiwan, which would undermine 
Chinese deterrence and send the wrong signals to Taiwan independence forces.  Others 
also worried that coordination with Taiwan on BMD would tighten both the military and 
political links between the U.S. and Taiwan.  In response, an American expert 
emphasized that missile defense would be ineffective for defending Taiwan from the 
more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan.  Another American 
participant argued that although missile defense cooperation could strengthen ties overall, 
the military coordination and integration with Taiwan has been very limited.  This is 
likely an issue that will need to be continuously addressed through official and unofficial 
channels. 
Fourth, Chinese experts were worried that BMD would lead to the tightening of 
alliances, and feared that these alliances would be increasingly aimed at China.  Several 
participants raised concerns not only with the tightening of U.S. alliance relations with 
Japan, but also with South Korea, and Australia.  Fifth, one Chinese expert raised a 
concern that the development of BMD would lead to a weaponization of space.  An 
American responded that there was nothing in the BMD architectures that was space-
based, except for the sensors.  Lastly, a Chinese participant said that some Chinese 
scientists talked about possible offensive uses for some of the technologies associated 
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with BMD.  Several American participants asked for clarification on this point and 
argued strongly that the technology would not have any offensive purpose. 
One Chinese participant argued that in response to American BMD efforts, China 
could either invest in countermeasures or increase the quality or quantity of its nuclear 
forces.  In response to BMD, this participant argued that such modernization would only 
reflect China’s attempts to maintain its minimum deterrent.  Another Chinese participant 
was pleased to hear some American experts recognize that this modernization would 
simply reflect China’s desire to guarantee the reliability and credibility of its nuclear 
deterrent.  This expert expressed a fear that some in the U.S. would perceive this 
defensive and reactive nuclear modernization as a great threat to the U.S. and as evidence 
of an aggressive China. 
PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE AND NFU 
The interaction between American emerging long-range precision strike 
capabilities (generally known now as prompt global strike) and China’s NFU pledge was 
discussed in several ways. Conventional attacks against China’s nuclear facilities drew 
more attention from the Chinese side given the discussion in the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) on prompt global strike (PGS).  One Chinese expert suggested that the possibility 
of such strikes might lead to a change in China’s NFU policy.  This expert suggested that 
if the U.S. has this intention (and made it clear in declaratory policy), China might need 
to rethink its NFU policy.  This participant further declared that the Chinese leadership 
might take such conventional attacks on nuclear facilities as a type of nuclear strike 
against China.  It was not clear (and likely deliberately ambiguous) if Chinese 
perceptions of U.S. intentions, changes in U.S. declaratory policy, or actual conventional 
attacks would be enough to trigger a reconsideration of the NFU policy.  
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Similarly, the Chinese participants expressed different views on a potential role 
for Chinese nuclear weapons in deterring or responding to conventional attacks, although 
no one suggested this would violate Beijing’s NFU. But, if conventional strikes 
threatened to eliminate Chinese nuclear forces, or even its conventional short-range 
ballistic missiles in Fujian, some role for nuclear deterrence in the absence of actual use 
might be possible.  It was not very clear, however, what role nuclear forces or nuclear 
deterrence might play in such a situation, though it is reasonable to conclude that one 
possibility would be nuclear signaling to enhance the credibility of nuclear threats.   
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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICY 
 Beyond the NPR, of course New START and the broader Prague vision of 
the Obama Administration were important, timely topics to be discussed. The Chinese 
participants unanimously viewed President Obama’s support for disarmament as a 
positive step in the right direction.  One Chinese expert was happy that President Obama 
endorsed a vision of a world without nuclear weapons in his Prague speech, and 
reminded the American participants that China had advocated a world without nuclear 
weapons since 1964.  Chinese participants were also pleased that U.S. and Russia agreed 
to reduce their nuclear arsenals as part of the New START treaty.  They were equally 
unanimous however, as discussed below, that the new nuclear superpowers will need to 
make much greater cuts in nuclear forces before China would be ready to engage in 
multilateral nuclear discussions or negotiations.  Both these initiatives are discussed 
below. 
NEW START 
 Although the Chinese participants viewed new commitments and 
reductions under New START as a positive development, several experts had questions 
and concerns.  One expert suggested that before the treaty was signed, there were 
expectations that total warheads would be reduced to 1,000.  This expert not only 
expressed some disappointment at the final figure of 1,550, but wondered if reducing to 
1,000 would be difficult for the United States.  An American responded that the smaller 
cuts were a result of an urgent need to reach an agreement that kept the inspection and 
verification regime intact, and that the treaty had to be acceptable to both parties in order 
to be concluded.  
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 Another Chinese participant highlighted that the cuts were not as deep as 
some might think because the negotiation only addressed deployed warheads and did not 
reduce the huge number in nuclear stockpiles.  This expert characterized this as shifting 
warheads, and not real disarmament.  American participants recognized the limited nature 
of these cuts, but highlighted that the process was moving in the correct direction and the 
importance of preserving the inspection and verification regime.  The American side 
highlighted the explicit aim in the new NPR not only to have further cuts, but also to 
move to count all warheads, not just deployed warheads, in such cuts. 
 Several Chinese experts questioned whether domestic support for nuclear 
reductions would continue and was concerned that this positive momentum would not 
last.  They argued that there were several specific factors—such as the Democrats 
returning to power, expiration of START, and the NPT Review Conference—that pushed 
the U.S. government to focus on this issue now.  But when these factors are no longer as 
prominent, they wondered if U.S. policy or U.S. focus on disarmament might change as 
well.  One expert specifically cited the domestic opposition to the U.S. ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an important factor that might limit the U.S. 
ability to follow through on disarmament commitments.  Chinese participants also 
wondered about the implications for U.S. support for disarmament if the Republicans 
were successful in the mid-term elections or if they won the presidency in 2012. 
 Lastly, one Chinese participant expressed a worry that one goal of U.S. 
disarmament efforts, and especially its efforts to bring China into this process, was to 
“get China trapped” into disarmament and limit its nuclear modernization.  Some 
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suggested that such worries were fairly widespread, although the most suspicious views 
did not hold at highest political levels. 
FUTURE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
 Chinese participants recognized growing U.S. expectations for China to 
become more involved in disarmament and arms control, but they unanimously argued 
that China is not ready for multilateral negotiations aimed at reduction of strategic 
weapons.  They forcefully argued that the large gap in nuclear weapons between China 
and the nuclear superpowers needed to be dramatically reduced before China would 
consider getting involved in such negotiations or discussions.  Although China is not 
ready to engage in multilateral negotiations, Chinese experts expressed a willingness to 
strengthen the non-proliferation regime.  One participant strongly averred that after the 
U.S. ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), China would as well; domestic 
political opinion in China had prevented China from ratifying it first. Chinese experts 
also expressed some support for putting the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at 
the center of non-proliferation regimes moving forward.  China and the U.S. both 
recognize that Pakistan is the major obstacle to advances on the FMCT, but they each 
look to the other as the solution.  The U.S. wants China to put pressure on Pakistan.  
China, on the other hand, views U.S. policy as the impediment, especially the nuclear 
deal with India.  China wants the U.S. to make security guarantees to Pakistan or offer a 
similar nuclear deal as with the Indians.  Although China has expressed support for 
strengthening the FMCT, there was no ground broken in this discussion on putting 
pressure on Pakistan to make that a reality.   
 Although China is clearly not ready to engage in multilateral negotiations 
anytime soon, Chinese participants were more specific than they have been in the past 
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about the requirements and conditions under which China might join such negotiations, 
and their preferred modalities.  One Chinese expert argued that President Hu Jintao’s 
decision to attend the September 2009 UN Security Council summit on nuclear 
proliferation and disarmament and the April 2010 nuclear security summit showed the 
leadership’s sincere interest in participating in this process.  Several other Chinese 
participants repeated Hu’s new commitment at the UN in September 2009 that China 
would participate in multilateral cooperation when the time and conditions were right.  
Chinese interlocutors emphasized that they viewed this as a positive step by the Chinese 
leadership. 
 Chinese participants described the conditions that might need to be met 
before China would join in negotiations.  All Chinese experts noted the huge gap in 
capabilities between the nuclear superpowers and China.  One expert suggested that 
China was not asking for equal numbers before China participated, but it would require 
some drastic cuts in overall nuclear capabilities.  These cuts would also have to include 
significant reductions in nuclear stockpiles and the elimination of tactical nuclear 
weapons before China would participate.  Several participants argued that their 
preference would be for any multilateral negotiations to be preceded by a NFU agreement 
or a non-use convention between the negotiating parties.  Another Chinese expert also 
suggested that if such an agreement or convention was reached, China would be 
interested in moving very quickly into verification talks.  
 Chinese participants preferred that any multilateral process would be 
comprehensive in terms of the issues discussed and the players involved.  In terms of 
issues, they did not want to have a narrow discussion focused solely on nuclear weapons, 
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but preferred wide-ranging discussions and negotiations that included missile defense, 
space capabilities, and PGS.  The Chinese experts argued that all of these issues were 
closely linked.  In terms of players, there was a lack of consensus on the Chinese side as 
to who might engage in discussion.  Some Chinese preferred any expanded nuclear 
dialogue to include at least the P-5, but others suggested the P-5 plus three (India, 
Pakistan, and Israel).  Other Chinese experts, however, argued that if India was not 
involved then any Chinese cuts might give India an incentive to “sprint to parity” and 
challenge China.  One expert argued that China would not be an obstacle, and that if 
other countries were willing to participate, it would be difficult for China not to do so as 
well.   
Still, and consistent with past interaction with the Chinese at this sort of forum, 
there was interest in learning more about the U.S.-Russian negotiations.   
 It may be premature to include China in any formal arms control 
negotiations, but American experts argued that China should not wait until all of its 
conditions are met before becoming involved in discussions.  An American expert 
suggested that it is too early to ask China to make commitments, but it is not too early to 
talk about principles and concepts.  Another American argued that discussions involving 
the P-5 countries on how to implement the visions of the Prague speech and nuclear 
summits are necessary as soon as possible.  Rather than waiting until the U.S. and Russia 
make deeper cuts in nuclear weapons, regional problems are solved, or other conditions 
are met, China should engage in discussions with other nuclear powers in parallel.  
American participants argued that early discussions on nuclear disarmament would not 
only make real breakthroughs easier once the preconditions were met, but China’s greater 
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commitment to the disarmament process might also push others to be more committed to 
the process as well.  
 American participants also suggested several specific issues that China 
should pay more attention to in the short-term.  Several American experts mentioned 
verification techniques and technologies as a difficult issue that would likely require 
many years of discussion and negotiation, and the earlier such discussions begin, the 
better.  Even though further cuts by the U.S. and Russia would be required before any 
negotiations could occur, discussions could also begin on delivery systems, nuclear 
infrastructure, and production of fissile material.  China is the only one of the P-5 that has 
not committed to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; such a 
commitment would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and give new impetus to 
multilateral disarmament.  One American suggested that because the U.S. and Russia are 
discussing issues that affect China, such as counting rules on bombers and deployed 
warheads, technology for verification, and notification for inspections, it is in China’s 
own interest to become more involved in these discussions.   
 The Chinese response to these suggestions was inconclusive.  One 
participant responded that it was too early to talk about verification; other countries 
needed to reduce their number of nuclear warheads as a precondition.  Still, future 
discussions on these issues would be useful, drawing a clear distinction between formal 
arms control negotiations which would occur much later and more informal discussions 
which could occur much sooner. 
 If China requires significant reductions in nuclear stockpiles before it will 
participate in multilateral negotiations, then it may be many years before China will 
41 
 
consider such meaningful participation.  According to an American expert, even with the 
positive momentum for disarmament, the next round of nuclear reductions will prove 
much more difficult.  It is not clear that Russia will support deeper cuts or intrusive 
verifications, and it is also unclear whether American domestic politics will support such 
reductions.  Although it may be many years before China participates in significant 
multilateral arms control negotiations, one American recommended a ban on testing 
physical ASAT weapons as a measure worthy of consideration.  In the meantime, the 
U.S. and China should strengthen their relationship by cooperating in combating nuclear 
terrorism and exploring confidence building measures in the nuclear realm. 
 A world without nuclear weapons is a vision that the U.S. and China both 
support, but both countries recognize that there is a long way to go to achieve it.  Experts 
from both countries agreed that preconditions not only included resolving current 
challenges such as the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs, but also 
deeper issues such as a resolution of regional conflicts and no threat of future 
proliferation.  Although both sides agreed on the great challenges in achieving such a 
vision, experts from the U.S. and China had very different understandings of the 
institutions that would be most important.  The American side emphasized the 
importance of strengthening the non-proliferation regime by bringing countries into 
compliance with the NPT, strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and adding 
verification power to the IAEA.  A Chinese expert, on the other hand, focused on the 
importance of UN Security Council and the creation of regional security regimes as the 
key institutions for achieving a world without nuclear weapons.  Although reaching 
“global zero” is an unrealistic goal in all but the distant future, these differences in the 
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preferred institutions to support disarmament may prove to be an obstacle to China’s 




Finally, a few topics were raised in passing: North Korea, India, and space issues.   
NORTH KOREA 
Unlike some past dialogues, North Korea was not the subject for any of the 
panels, but there were some discussions about events on the Korean peninsula.  One 
Chinese expert argued that although some have said China has accepted a nuclear North 
Korea, this was not correct.  This participant suggested that China had no desire to 
protect North Korea, and was in a “great panic” over how to convince North Korea to 
abandon its nuclear weapons.  The Chinese side emphasized that they perceived a nuclear 
North Korea as a real threat to China’s security interests, but China was in a difficult 
position because it needed to pressure the North Korean regime while still maintaining 
stability on the peninsula, which was China’s most important concern.  Other participants 
echoed the importance of avoiding collapse of the regime.  Chinese experts emphasized 
that China had continued to play a constructive role in resolving the North Korean 
nuclear crisis.  Some American participants, however, suggested that China’s continued 
support for the regime and unwillingness to punish North Korea even after aggressive 
behavior showed that China’s behavior was not particularly helpful or constructive.  
Chinese participants did not offer views on how China should respond to the North 
Korean torpedo attack on a South Korean warship (the Cheonan Incident).   
The future of the Korean peninsula was also raised in discussions of what kind of 
ultimate resolution of the issue would be required to move towards a world without 
nuclear weapons.  One expert summarized the Chinese position on the future of the 
peninsula as any reunified Korea should be: (1) nuclear free, (2) be accomplished through 
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peaceful means, and (3) have no foreign interference before, during, or after unification.  
The United States was specifically mentioned in this context.  Interestingly, another 
participant seemed to portray Chinese policy somewhat more moderately, suggesting that 
a West German model of reunification might be acceptable.  It was unclear if the West 
German model simply meant a pro-U.S. tilt or incorporation within the U.S. alliance 
system (NATO in the German case, and thus the hub-and-spoke alliance system in the 
Korean case). 
INDIA 
The potential threat to China from India’s nuclear weapons received more 
attention from Chinese participants at this dialogue than at previous dialogues.  Even 
though India’s nuclear forces are currently smaller than China’s, one Chinese expert cited 
some Indian defense analysts who talked about India’s plans to surpass China in nuclear 
forces.  Chinese participants seemed worried that if China became involved in nuclear 
disarmament talks with the U.S. and Russia, this might provide India with incentives to 
rapidly modernize and surpass Chinese capabilities.  Chinese concerns about India’s 
“sprint to parity” seem similar to American concerns about a Chinese “sprint to parity.”  
These Chinese concerns may limit China’s willingness to engage in disarmament talks 
that do not involve India. 
SPACE 
Space was not the subject of any of the panels, but participants discussed space in 
the context of missile defense and arms control.  Chinese participants argued that even 
though China’s missile defense test was not part of an effort to weaponize space, they 
believed the U.S. had already weaponized space, in part through its missile defense 
program.  One expert argued that U.S. weaponization of space was a major obstacle to 
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nuclear disarmament and creating a world without nuclear weapons.  Some Chinese 
participants suggested that contrary to the U.S., China opposed the weaponization of 
space and would be interested in negotiating treaties that limited military use of space.  
An American expert acknowledged that there was not much support in the U.S. for 
limitations or space arms control measures, but suggested that a test ban on physical 
ASAT weapons was worthy of discussion.  In a brief discussion of China’s ASAT test, a 
Chinese participant noted the importance for China’s prestige, but also highlighted the 
coercive utility of the test, which made the U.S. more interested in discussing such issues.  
It is not clear if some Chinese also saw the potential coercive value of China’s missile 
defense test.  Space issues will become more important in bilateral military exchanges as 
well as future nuclear dialogues.   
46 
 
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, AND WAY 
FORWARD 
 This was one of the most open discussions between the two sides on this 
topic that has occurred in this series of meetings.  Several factors likely account for this.  
Substantively, the new NPR clearly played a positive role. Additionally, the substantial 
continuity in participants led to a degree of shared understanding that facilitated 
communication.  
 Several areas would seem to merit consideration for the future.  These are 
grouped into categories of U.S. policy, Chinese policy, negotiations/arms control, and 
process. 
UNITED STATES POLICY 
• More discussion about the continuing evolution of U.S. missile defense plans and 
capabilities would likely reduce misperceptions on the Chinese side.  Formal 
government presentations as well as informal diplomacy, to a lesser extent, can 
advance this goal.  China’s modernization responds in part at least to American 
missile defense programs. Since a more complete discussion of the changes in the 
current U.S. program should reduce Chinese concerns, increased U.S. 
transparency on BMD will likely advance U.S. interests.   
• A similar point can be made for PGS capabilities and policy.  The emphasis in 
PDUSD Miller’s testimony repudiating a desire to undermine China’s deterrent 
capability should be emphasized in other fora. 
• Additional elucidation of “strategic stability” will be useful.  The term has a cold 
war context.  The comparison with the adversarial relationship with the Soviet 
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Union will not be viewed favorably.  But the elements of that term that touch on 
avoiding threatening the other sides’ deterrent force would be. This can be 
discussed by academics as they can characterize the context within which the term 
originates.   
CHINESE POLICY  
• China should provide more clarity about the analytical link between “lean and 
effective” and force postures.  The term seems to have an analytic component that 
would be beneficial to elucidate. 
• Chinese claims on transparency have typically depended on is characterization of 
it as a greatly weaker and more vulnerable power.  As the growth in Chinese 
warhead numbers reduces the potential for transparency to undermine China’s 
deterrent, China should explain what sorts of transparency will be forthcoming.   
• The potential for catastrophe in North Korea should be discussed.  If the North 
collapses, both the United States and China will face difficult choices.  These 
should be probed more widely through official and unofficial channels. Any 
coordination of military activity in the context of a North Korean scenario will be 
highly challenging.  Still, given the highly escalatory nature of that sort of crisis, 
even a deeper understanding of Chinese potential actions—absent explicit 
coordination with them—would be highly stabilizing. 
FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL 
• Further discussion of the interaction between Chinese modernization plans and 
subsequent arms control negotiations is warranted.  Clearly, future cuts cannot 
occur in the context of any rapid growth of the Chinese arsenal.  This is likely to 
be a useful area for Moscow, Beijing, and Washington do discuss.  
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• It is premature to engage China officially on strategic arms control issues as a 
negotiating partner, for many reasons.  That said, there is a range of possible ways 
for the two sides to talk about nuclear issues would be helpful.  Track II meetings, 
official briefs, discussions of the full range of diplomatic negotiations—beyond 
arms reduction talks—can advance both sides’ understanding of the potential 
here. 
• Further engagement on both CTBT and FMCT seems warranted, as there may be 
grounds for progress there.   
PROCESS RELATED 
• More discussion on terminology, its context, and relevant definitions would be 
highly valuable.  The Chinese side was interested in engaging actively on this, 
and was willing to provide a list of key terms in China’s nuclear strategy and 
policy to be addressed in future dialogues. U.S. participants too found this to be 
an important discussion.  This is ideal for track II work. Most important among 
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U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE, PHASE V 
CONFERENCE AGENDA 
Conference organized by U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum-CSIS for 




2-4 May 2010 
Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii 
 
6:30pm  Reception and Dinner – Rainbow Suite (Rainbow Tower) 
Sunday, May 2, 2010 
 
8:30am  Continental Breakfast – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa Tower) 
Monday, May 3, 2010 
 
9:00-10:00am Welcome and Introductions – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa 
Tower) 
   
Prof. Christopher Twomey 
Mr. David Hamon, Analytical Services, Inc. 
Col. (ret.) Zhang Tuosheng, CFISS 
 
10:00am-12:00pm Session 1: Global Zero, a declared goal of both 
 
How does each side visualize the regional and global security environment 
in a world without nuclear weapons? (In particular, how would global and 
regional stability be affected?)  What new threats or challenges would each 
country need to take more seriously in such a world? Working backward from 
such a future, what does the world look like during the period leading up to the 
elimination of the last weapon? What role does the NPT regime play in this 
evolution? What are the major obstacles to accomplishing this goal? 
 
Chair:   Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS 
Presenters:  Dr. Li Hong, CACDA 
 Ms. Sharon Squassoni, CSIS 
 
12:00-1:30pm  Lunch – Palace Lounge 
 




Each side has recently expanded on its nuclear doctrine.  By April 2010, 
the United States should have completed its Nuclear Posture Review.  In 2009, 
the leaders of the Second Artillery published articles in Qiushi and Zhongguo 
Junshi Kexue and the 2008 White Paper on China’s National Defense included a 
more extensive deliberation of the Chinese’ strategic doctrine than previous White 
Papers.  Continuities with the past in both sides’ policy are well understood.  
However, further discussion of changes is warranted.  What is the fundamental 
nature of the changes in each side’s policy? What are the sources of changes?  
What steps are being taken to carry out such changes? What interaction between 
the two sides developments does each side see? What is the relation between 
capabilities and the policy changes? 
 
Chair:   S. Col. Yao Yunzhu, AMS  
Presenters:  Prof. Chu Shulong, Tsinghua 
  Ms. Elaine Bunn, NDU 
3:15-3:30pm  Break 
3:30-5:15pm  Session 3: A few definitions: breakout session 
       – Tapa Ballroom 3, Iolani 6/7  
The participants will be divided into three breakout sessions that will each 
be asked to come up with short definitions of a designated set of four of the 
following terms as they understand them.  Clearly, “consensus” definitions will 
not be possible in all cases; caveats and dissentions should of course be related as 
well. 
• nuclear threshold 
Group A 
• escalation control 
• counter-coercion 
• key point counterattack 
 
• extended deterrence 
Group B 
• inadvertent escalation 
• no first use 




• deterrence by denial 
Group C 
• crisis stability 
• effective and reliable 
deterrence 
• first strike 
 
• strategic deterrence 
Other possible terms 
• conventional deterrence 
• spiral (of escalation) 
• secure second strike 
• peaceful use of space 
  




6:00pm  Reception and Dinner – Rainbow Suite (Rainbow Tower)
8:00am Continental Breakfast – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa Tower) 
 Tuesday, 
May 4, 2010  
 
8:30-10:15am Reports from breakout session – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa Tower) 
 
Chairs:  Zhu Feng/Teng Jianqun/Yao Yunzhu 
  Wirtz/McDevitt/Kamp 
 




10:30am-12:15pm Session 4: Missile Defense 
 
How has the each side’s missile defense posture (capabilities, doctrine, 
and incorporation in broader national strategy) evolved?  What are the sources of 
these changes?  How do they contribute to security and stability?   
 
What aspects of each nation’s policies are regarded as constructive and 
what as problematic?  How has each side reacted to the other’s missile defense 
posture evolution? What is the range of possible future developments in this area 
faced by each side, and how might they interact? Do such systems suggest desires 
by each side for “absolute security.” 
 
Chair:   RADM (ret.) Michael McDevitt, CNA 
Presenters:  Dr. Dean Wilkening, CISAC, Stanford 
  Dr. Wu Chunsi, SIIS  
 
12:30-2:00pm  Lunch – Palace Lounge 
  
2:00-4:00pm  Session 5: The Next Negotiations 
 
What issues belong at the table for future formal negotiations on 
confidence building measures and arms control discussions? In particular, after 
the current round of US-Russian negotiations what categories of issues should be 
American and Chinese priorities for international arms control, broadly 
conceived, negotiations?  What should China’s role be in global or narrower 
multilateral fora? On space in particular, what concrete steps would advance the 
process beyond those already taken?  What opportunities and challenges lie down 
such a path in general for each side? 
 
Chair:  Col. (ret.) Teng Jianqun, CIIS  
Presenters:  Mr. Gu Guoliang CASS 
  Amb. Linton Brooks, CSIS 
 




4:15-4:45pm  Session: 6 Lessons Learned and Way Forward 
 
Facilitator: Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS 
 
4:45-5:00pm  Closing Remarks 
   
 Mr. David Hamon, Analytical Services, Inc 
 Col. (ret.) Zhang Tuosheng, CFISS 
Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS 
 
6:15pm    Meet at Kalia Tower Lobby to walk to:  
    Chart House Waikiki Restaurant 
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